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Passage to Modernity: An Essay in the Hermeneutics of Nature and Culture,
by Louis Dupre. New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1993.
Pp. x and 300. $30.00.
LYNN S. JOY, Duke University
Dupre's Passage to Modernity is a passionately written meditation on
how changing conceptions of nature and the self produced in Western
Europe a culture of modernity alienated from the belief that nature and
the self must be conceived as dependent on a transcendent God. This is
a work of immense scholarship, and one of its main purposes is to show
the plausibility of the historical thesis that the principles definitive of
modernity were almost fully developed in the period between the end of
the fourteenth century and the first half of the seventeenth century (p.
11). Thus Dupre is committed to the view that the Enlightenment was
not the formative moment for modern European culture, but rather was
preceded by several centuries of Christian humanist thought and practice which introduced new naturalistic approaches to understanding
human nature. Moreover these new approaches retained a significant
role for a transcendent God, whose relations with both the natural world
and the human subject enriched their meaningfulness in ways that far
surpassed what Dupre views as the culturally impoverished experience
of nature and the self characteristic of modernity.
Such an account of the emergence of distinctively modern attitudes
within a securely Christian pre-Enlightenment culture separates Dupre's
diagnosis of what went wrong with modernity from those of philosophical critics like Nietzsche or, more recently, Hans Blumenberg, because
they locate the origins of what went wrong with modernity in longstanding conflicts inherited from ancient Greek culture or developed at
successive stages of Christianity's accommodation to Greek and Roman
influences. Dupre's diagnosis also differs from that offered by those
critics of modernity who treat the secular values embodied in
Enlightenment institutions and systems of thought as deeply problematic and who trace modernity's mistakes almost exclusively to such eighteenth-century sources.
But this is no ordinary history book, for another of its main purposes is to
lay the groundwork for a critique of modernity that will reintegrate selected
modern attitudes with premodern Christian beliefs about the dependence
of nature and the self on a transcendent God. Dupre praises, for instance,
the religious and aesthetic sensibility of many Baroque thinkers and artists
who, he argues, successfully achieved the last such synthesis of nature and
grace--a synthesis that was nonetheless shortlived, ending in the decade
after the settlement of the Thirty Years' War in 1648. Clearly he hopes that
his own critique of modernity will not throw the baby out with the bath
water. Modern culture can, he thinks, be redeemed by creating a new synthesis through the coherent revision of our presuppositions about nature,
the self, and God. Essential to this revision is the study of Christian humanism broadly construed, especially as practiced by Renaissance and
Reformation philosophers holding a variety of doctrinal positions.
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How is one to evaluate a book of such ambitious scope? Religious
spirituality, the natural sciences, theology, philosophy, art, music, and
politics all are encompassed in Dupre's efforts to suggest how the culture of Western Europe changed when its people either turned away
from God altogether or else sustained their beliefs about God only by
grounding them in more basic commitments to naturalism or to notions
of subjectivity. One might of course simply recommend that readers of
Passage to Modernity judge this thought-provoking work for themselves,
sampling and testing the author's interpretations of whatever texts most
interest the individual reader. However, Dupre himself would very
likely discourage this sort of reading of his book since he explicitly
remarks, "A reflection on past thought that is not a search for permanent
meaning leaves us defenseless against cultural nihilism" (p. 9).
Dupre's search for "permanent meaning" seems to require that a single system of meanings be found even in the heterogeneous writings of
late Medieval, Renaissance, and Reformation thinkers. This system of
meanings is assumed by him to underlie the kind of synthesis of cultural
elements that would count as a reintegration of the natural and the
divine. But it is here that scholars of Renaissance and Reformation
thought may significantly disagree with his search for a once-and-future
Christian synthesis. For what the study of Renaissance and Reformation
texts can teach us-as perhaps no other body of writings before the
twentieth century can-is that no one system of meanings was in fact
elicited from the heterogeneous traditions that fueled late humanist culture. Given their impressive feats of learning, the fact that the authors of
those texts failed to consolidate their respective views into a new synthesis of Egyptian, Hebrew, Creek, Roman, Christian, Arabic, and Medieval
traditions must be reckoned with by anyone who examines the reasons
why modern attitudes replaced those of the late humanists. This
extended crisis of multiple authorities proved to be intolerable for
Renaissance culture as a whole. As Brian Copenhaver has put it:
The prospect of choosing among metaphysical claims or among
attitudes towards metaphysics ... was a terrible freedom for a
culture so well-integrated in its beliefs. Metaphysics was no distant philosophical preoccupation in the Renaissance. People
died for metaphysics. . .. After the Renaissance, no metaphysics would ever again achieve the supremacy enjoyed by the
Peripatetic system for most of twenty centuries. 1
Renaissance and Reformation culture was characterized by an extraordinary multiplication of new and old competing traditions in nearly all areas
of belief and learning. The humanists' inability to assimilate these rival
commitments within a coherent, shared framework led not only to doctrinal conflict and political wars, but also ultimately to the rejection of the
humanists' project of confronting and reconciling rival traditions in every
field, from the natural sciences to ethics, from politics to theology. The
irreconcilable differences among such divergent claims to cultural authority were what modern philosophers beginning with Descartes hoped to
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avoid by making deliberate breaks with tradition. A chief aim of the moderns during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries was to restore order
to a culture which they thought had been fragmented by their predecessors. The one error many of these moderns refused to tolerate was eclecticism, or the lack of a rigorous foundation for one's own beliefs.
Dupre's suggestions for a critique of modernity in this book seriously
underestimate the extent to which the very moderns whom he criticizes
were dedicated to achieving a goal similar to his own: the creation of a new
Christian synthesis of nature and the human subject with a transcendent
God. Why does he think that his twentieth-century project stands a better
chance of succeeding where the attempts of modern philosophers from
Descartes to Kant failed? More importantly, why does he think that what
the late humanists and late scholastics, such as Gassendi and Suarez, could not
accomplish can possibly be achieved by anyone else? My own view is that
the late humanists and late scholastics were better placed than both the
moderns and the critics of modernity to fulfill Dupre's aims, and their failure to do so is one of the great lessons of history. There were indeed good
reasons to become a modern in the context of that failure. Whatever else
their shortcomings, the modern philosophers had no illusions about this
and recognized that the methods of the late humanists needed radical revision. Dupre, who seeks to resuscitate the outlook of Christian humanism
with the help of Heideggerian metaphysics, would do well to consider that
much of what he regards as modernity's errors began as the rational choices
of those who knew firsthand the excesses of too many beliefs about transcendent realities. Passage to Modernity is certainly right in its claim that
modern values and attitudes were well established long before the
Enlightenment, but this highly engaging book obscures a central feature of
its two-stage narrative: the modernity of the Enlightenment was in many
ways an unavoidable outcome of the modernity of the Renaissance. Any
project which tries to revive the latter while subverting the former cannot
base its claim to plausibility on an argument from history.
NOTES
1.
Brian P. Copenhaver and Charles B. Schmitt, Renaissance Philosophy
(Oxford/New York: Oxford University Press, 1992), pp. 349-50.

Belief Policies, by Paul Helm. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1994. Pp. xiii and 226. $54.95 (Cloth).
TRENTON MERRICKS, Virginia Commonwealth University
A belief-policy, according to Paul Helm, is a type of belief. A beliefpolicy is, to a first approximation, a belief about how what one believes
ought to be related to one's evidence, given that one's goal is forming
true beliefs. There is no question that many of us have higher-order

